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ABSTRACT

Framing and default effects have been studied for more
than a decade in different disciplines. A common criticism
of these studies is that they use hypothetical scenarios. In
this study, we developed a real decision environment: a
Facebook application in which users had to decide whether
or not they wanted to be automatically publicly tagged in
their friends’ pictures and/or tag their friends in their own
pictures. To ensure ecological validity, participants had to
log in to their Facebook account. Our results confirmed
previous studies indicating a higher tagging rate in
positively framed and accept-by-default conditions.
Furthermore, we introduced a manipulation that we
assumed would overshadow and thereby reduce the effects
of default and framing: a justification highlighting a
positive or negative descriptive social norm or giving a
rationale for or against tagging. We found that such
justifications may at times increase tagging rates.
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vated to indicate their true preferences. The decisions we
investigate in the current study involve consenting to
(automatically) tagging oneself in one’s friends’ Facebook
pictures and tagging one’s friends in one’s own pictures.
To ensure ecological validity, users had to log in to their
Facebook account, and hence they perceived real risks and
real benefits as a consequence of their decisions.
We conducted a study measuring users’ acceptance (the
“tagging rate”) of such an automatic photo-tagging system.
We integrate default and framing effects, and we introduce
a method that is hypothesized to overshadow and thereby
reduce these effects: In some experimental conditions, we
provide a “justification” that highlights a presumed
positive or negative descriptive social norm of using the
photo-tagging system (“3%” vs. “97% of participants used
the auto-tagger”); in other conditions, this justification
provides a rationale for or against tagging (“the tagged
pictures could be embarrassing” vs. “tagging may increase
your social bond”); a final condition showed no
justification. Depending on the underlying cause of the
default and framing effects, either of these justifications
should be able to reduce the default and framing effects.
RELATED WORK AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Main effects of framing and defaults

Social network users are required to make privacy decisions on a regular basis. These decisions are susceptible to
framing effects (irrational influences of the way an option
is presented to the user on the outcome of their decision
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)) and default effects (similar
influences of the option that is chosen by default
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988)). Johnson et al. (2002)
and Lai and Hui (2006) independently found framing and
default effects to have a significant impact on users’ privacy decisions (i.e., their willingness to be notified concerning other health surveys or to receive a newsletter).
Both studies showed users a checkbox with a label. The
framing was manipulated via the label wording (“Please
send me newsletters” versus “Please do not send me
newsletters”). The default was manipulated by whether the
checkbox was initially set to accept or reject the
newsletters. Both studies found that framing and defaults
have a separate and additive effect on users’ decisions.

Levin and Gearth (1988) argue that a positive frame elicits
arguments in favor of the action, while a negative frame
elicits arguments against the action. Hardisty et al. (2009)
demonstrate that this effect is mediated by the order in
which decision-makers evaluate positive and negative
arguments (the “query theory”). A positive (negative)
frame causes users to evaluate positive (negative) arguments first. Because of this, the majority of arguments they
evaluate are positive (negative), and they end up more
(less) likely to consent. Alternatively, framing can be
explained as a normative effect: a decision-maker may
interpret the positive (negative) framing of a decision as
representing the positive (negative) attitude the requester
has towards the decision (Sher & McKenzie, 2006). As
such, a positive frame suggests an injunctive norm
supporting the decision, while a negative frame suggests an
injunctive norm against the decision.

A common criticism of default and framing studies is that
they involve hypothetical scenarios: users are not moti-

In our study on Facebook photo tagging, framing is
manifested in whether users are given the option to apply
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the automated tagging procedure, or rather the option to
NOT apply it. Based on existing evidence (Johnson et al.,
2002; Lai & Hui, 2006), and given that framing effects can
be explained by the query theory and injunctive social
norms (Hardisty & Weber, 2009; Sher & McKenzie, 2006),
we state the following hypothesis:

of all other participants have chosen to use the automated
tagging procedure. We state the following hypotheses:

H1: A positive framing results in a higher tagging rate than
a negative framing.
Dinner et al. (2011) present three possible causes of default
effects. The first two causes have to do with the effort of
choosing the default, either in terms of physical effort
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) or mental effort (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974). As a third cause, they demonstrate
that the query theory can explain default effects: a positive
(negative) default causes users to evaluate positive
(negative) arguments first, which makes them more (less)
likely to consent with the request. Finally, McKenzie et al.
(2006) show that people tend to infer the attitude of the
messenger not only from the framing of a request but also
from the default option. Combined with a framing effect, a
default endorsement of the framed option may reinforce the
implicit social norm communicated by the message
framing.
In our study, the default setting is manifested in whether
the automated tagging procedure will be applied or rather
NOT applied if the user simply does not change the current
setting. Based on existing evidence (Johnson et al., 2002;
Lai & Hui, 2006), and given that default effects can be
explained by cognitive and mental effort, query theory, and
injunctive social norms (Dinner et al., 2011; McKenzie et
al., 2006), we state the following hypothesis:
H2: The Tag by Default conditions result in a higher
tagging rate than the Do Not Tag by Default conditions.
Effect moderators

Framing and defaults are often considered harmful because
they may cause users to behave counter to their “true
preferences” (John, Acquisti, & Loewenstein, 2011). Here
we describe two interventions that may diminish or even
eradicate their effect. These moderators have not been
studied in prior work, but their effectiveness can be
hypothesized based on the psychological mechanisms that
may underlie the framing and default effects.
Studies have shown that for a norm to influence people’s
behavior; it has to be focal (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno,
1991). So, when two normative cues provide conflicting
information, people are more likely to behave in
accordance with the norm expressed by the most salient
cue. Given that both framing and default effects can be
explained as an injunctive social norm (McKenzie et al.,
2006; Sher & McKenzie, 2006), we hypothesize that a
sufficiently salient and conflicting descriptive social norm
can reduce or even eradicate the framing and default
effects. In our study on Facebook photo tagging, this
descriptive social norm takes the form of a “justification”
indicating that either a small minority or a large majority

H3: Normative cues moderate the effect of framing on
tagging: A conflicting norm (negative cue + positively
framed decision or positive cue + negatively framed
decision) will reduce the difference in tagging rates
between the positive and negative framing conditions.
H4: Normative cues moderate the effect of defaults on
tagging: A conflicting norm (negative cue + tag by default
or positive cue + do not tag) will reduce the difference in
tagging rates between the Tag by Default and Do Not Tag
by Default conditions.
According to the query theory, the framing of a request
(Hardisty & Weber, 2009) and the default (Dinner et al.,
2011) influence the order in which people query their
minds for positive and negative arguments: they will
evaluate arguments in favor of the frame/default and
against the alternative first, before they evaluate arguments
against the frame/default and in favor of the alternative.
This will, in turn, increase their likelihood to decide in the
direction of the frame/default. As a means to counter the
query-ordering effect of respectively framing and defaults,
researchers have attempted to “force” participants to ask
queries in a specific order. Indeed, when participants are
asked to do this, the framing and default effects disappear,
and participants’ decisions simply follow the imposed
query order (Dinner et al., 2011; Hardisty & Weber, 2009).
From the perspective of an (online) application, however,
forcing users to follow a certain query order is unwanted if
not infeasible. Hence, we introduce query supporting
rationales which arguably encourage users to give
precedence to the queries in line with this rationale. If this
is indeed the case, then we expect users’ decisions to
simply follow the rationale-supported query order, and the
framing and default effects will disappear:
H5: Query-supporting rationale-based cues moderate the
effect of framing on tagging rates: A conflicting rationale
will reduce the difference in tagging rates between the
positive and negative framing conditions.
H6: Query-supporting rationale-based cues moderate the
effect of defaults on tagging rates: A conflicting rationale
will reduce the difference in tagging rates between the Tag
by Default and Do Not Tag by Default conditions.
METHOD

Participants were told that we are developing a Facebook
application that can automatically tag people in pictures.
We recruited 924 participants (plus 50 pilot participants)
through online platforms. They were paid $1.30 for their
participation. We required participants to have an active
Facebook account with at least ten friends. On average,
participants had 427 Facebook friends.
Participants were asked to log into Facebook, giving basic
profile and friends list permissions to our app. They were
then informed about the benefits and consequences of
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using the application, making the value proposition of the
eventual decision unambiguously clear for all participants.
They were then asked to tag the people in four researcherprovided photos, followed by a phase where they would
correct mistakes in photos that were ostensibly tagged by
the algorithm. We made sure that participants would have
to make no corrections at all, so as to demonstrate that the
algorithm was accurate and reliable.
Participants would then be given the opportunity to use the
auto-tagging procedure themselves—a question we
manipulated in terms of default, framing, and justification.
In our pilot study, we gave participants the option to tag
themselves in all of their friends’ photos, and to tag all of
their friends in all of their own photos. However, none of
the participants accepted this offer, regardless of the
experimental condition (a testament to the realism of our
study, but a problem nonetheless). To reduce the overall
risk of the decision, we reduced its scope: We asked
participants for the names of three Facebook friends they
regularly interact with, developed a decision page for each
of these friends, “identified” a number of “previously
unseen photos” (in reality, a random number between 5 and
15), and offered participants to tag themselves and/or their
friend in those photos (Figure 1).

Reducing default and framing effects in privacy decision-making

4.

5.

to see some of these photos, because they could be
embarrassing!)”
Positive rationale-based justification: “(Note: Autotagged photos will show up on the Facebook walls of
the tagged friends, where their friends can see them.
This will strengthen your friendship and let your
friends relive the good times they had with you!)”
None

Final questionnaires

In the final part, participants were asked to list reasons to
use or not to use the auto-tagger to tag themselves in their
friend’s pictures and their friend in their own pictures, for
each of the three friends. Participants were then debriefed
about the purpose of the study and ascertained that the
auto-tagger was fake and had not tagged any of their
photos. This study was certified by an institutional review
board and researchers addressed all ethical concerns.
Table 1. The Default and Framing manipulations.

Presentation
 Automatically tag me in
those pictures.
 Automatically tag me in
those pictures.
 Do NOT automatically tag
me in those pictures.
 Do NOT automatically tag
me in those pictures.

Default
Accept

Framing
Positive

Reject

Positive

Reject

Negative

Accept

Negative

RESULTS

Figure 1. An example experimental condition (accept
by default, positive framing, negative rationale-based
justification) in the “decision” phase of the study.
Manipulations

The study follows a 2x2x5 between-subjects design. Like
most existing studies on defaults and framing, it combines
a default setting manipulation (accept versus reject) with a
framing manipulation (positive versus negative) as shown
in Table 1. We add a “justification” manipulation, with two
normative justifications (positive/negative), two rationalebased justifications (positive and negative), and a condition
with no justification:
1.
2.
3.

Negative descriptive normative justification: “(Note:
3% of our study participants chose this option)”
Positive descriptive normative justification: “(Note:
97% of our study participants chose this option)”
Negative rationale-based justification: “(Note: Autotagged photos will show up on the Facebook walls of
the tagged friends, where their friends can see them.
Beware that they may not want others (parents, boss)

Each participant made six yes/no decisions—for each of
the three friends, they indicated whether they allowed the
auto-tagger to tag their friend in their pictures and whether
they allowed it to tag themselves in their friend’s pictures.
We run multilevel logistic regressions with a random
intercept to account for repeated measurements per
participant. Our DV is the decision to allow/prevent the
auto-tagger (tagging rate) and the default, framing, and
justifications are the IVs. Justification is modeled as an
interaction between “type” (none, normative, rationalebased) and “valence” (positive, negative), with no
distinction in valence in the “no justification” condition.
We first analyzed the framing and default effects regardless
of the justification (see Table 2), and found a significant
positive main effect for both framing (H1) and defaults
(H2), with no interaction effect between the two. Figure 2
displays the framing and default effects
Table 2. The effect of framing and defaults on tagging rate.

Overall odds
Default (tag vs. do not tag)
Framing (pos. vs. neg.)
Default x Framing

Odds ratio
0.143
10.340
4.854
0.993
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valence in the normative justification condition. However,
this effect does not reduce or extinguish the default effect
(H3). Rather, Figure 4 shows that the framing effect is
stronger in the positive normative cue condition.

Figure 2. The effects of defaults and framing on tagging rate.
Table 3. The effect of framing and justifications on tagging.

Baseline odds (Just. = none)
Justification type (vs. none)
Descriptive normative
Rationale-based
Justification type x Valence
Descriptive normative
Rationale-based
Framing (pos. vs. neg.)
Justification type x Framing
Descriptive normative
Rationale-based
Just. x Valence x Framing
Descriptive normative
Rationale-based

Odds ratio
0.210

p value

0.805
0.514

.608
.122

2.138
1.372
4.558

.105
.523
.031

1.292
0.714

.762
.695

6.129
0.674

.053
.690

To test H4 and H6, we ran a similar model with defaults,
justification type, and valence. We did not run the two
models together due to convergence issues. Table 4 shows
that in the “no justification” condition, defaults have a
marginally significant effect. There is also a significant
interaction between defaults and justification type: the
effect of defaults is ~7 times larger in the rationale-based
condition (see rightmost panel of Figure 4). This effect is
contrary to H4 and H6, which predicted that justifications
would weaken the default effect. There is also no three-way
interaction, i.e., the default-exacerbating effect of the
rationale-based justification occurs regardless of valence.
Table 4. The effect of defaults and justifications on tagging.

Baseline odds (Just. = none)
Justification type (vs. none)
Descriptive normative
Rationale-based
Justification type x Valence
Descriptive normative
Rationale-based
Default (tag vs. do not tag)
Justification type x Default
Descriptive normative
Rationale-based
Just. x Valence x Default
Descriptive normative
Rationale-based

Odds ratio
0.225

p value

0.695
0.460

.383
.068

2.585
1.376
3.355

.043
.522
.079

2.446
7.065

.283
.022

0.470
1.583

.420
.646

Figure 3. The effect of framing and justifications on tagging.

To test H3 and H5, we ran a factorial model with framing,
justification type and valence. Framing and valence were
centered, but justification type was dummy-coded with
“none” as baseline. Since valence only applies to the
normative and rationale-based justification conditions, we
exclude main effects of valence. Table 3 shows that there
is no main effect of either of the two justifications, nor is
their interaction with valence significant. In the “no
justification” condition, framing has a significant overall
effect. There is no significant overall interaction between
framing and justification type, but there is a marginally
significant interaction between framing, justification, and

Figure 4. The effect of defaults and justifications on tagging.
DISCUSSION

We were able to confirm framing and default effects in the
context of photo tagging on Facebook. This proved to be a
very realistic environment—the surprising results of our
pilot study suggest that participants strongly believed that
the photos would be tagged if they accepted the offer.
Hence, we demonstrate that default and framing effects are
not just an artifact of studies with unmotivated participants:
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these effects persist even when participants are highly
motivated to make the correct decision.

dangers of justifications in combination with established
biases which may induce users to act irresponsibly.
Platform managers need to carefully consider our findings
when offering privacy decisions so as to not accidentally
urge users to compromise their privacy against their will.
Also, we inform users about these effects that they need to
mind when making privacy-related decisions.

In contrast to our hypotheses, the justifications were not
able to reduce framing and default effects. This suggests
that these effects persist even in light of appeals to norms
and rationales. We did, however, find that positive normative cues can boost tagging rate in combination with
positive framing, while positive rationale-based justifications support participation in the positive default condition. Thus, it seems that justifications that are consistent
with the framing or default setting may increase tagging
rates (i.e., reduce privacy concerns).
It needs to be acknowledged that in the baseline condition
only approximately 25% of participants decided to opt-in
to the auto picture tagging. Thus, another experiment is
necessary investigating the described effects in a situation
where the opt-in is more common. This will help us
identify whether conceptually consistent justifications
always have a concern-diminishing effect, or whether they
may also help increase privacy-oriented behavior.
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